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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to analyze the domestic air transport industry in Spain. 
This work has focused on the segment of business and we present a theoretical model 
of oligopolistic competition which could be empirically tested through three equations: 
demand, market structure and price. We contribute to develop creativity and innovation 
with the elaboration of a data studying 113 over 96 fortnight periods (2011-2015) where 
analyses how clients react to both strategic changes carried out by airlines (frequencies, 
capacity, prices) and changes in socio-economic factors. The analysis is performed by 
applying the econometric technique of instrumental variables. We find that that fre-
quency competition -Cournot- is more important than competition in prices  -Bertrand-.
Key Words: Airlines; oligopolistic competition; market structure; vertical differentia-
tion
Resumen
El objetivo de este estudio es analizar la industria del transporte aéreo en España. Este 
trabajo se ha centrado en el segmento de negocio y presentamos un modelo teórico 
de competencia oligopolística que puede ser empíricamente probado a través de tres 
ecuaciones: de demanda, de cuota de mercado y de precio. Contribuimos a desarrollar 
la creatividad y la innovación con la elaboración de una muestra que estudia 113 rutas 
durante 96 quincenas (2011-2015), donde se analiza cómo reaccionan los clientes tanto a 
los cambios estratégicos realizados por las líneas aéreas (frecuencias, capacidad, precios) 
como a cambios socio-económicos. El análisis se realiza aplicando la técnica economé-
trica de las variables instrumentales y los resultados muestran que la competencia en 
este mercado se produce a la Cournot.
Palabras clave: Aerolíneas; competencia oligopolística; estructura de mercado; diferen-
ciación vertical 
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1. Introduction 
The liberalisation of air transport which took place in the European Union in the early 
nineties following the trend coming from the United States had positive effects for 
Spanish passengers allowing them to choose between more companies, more frequen-
cies and much lower prices. 
In addition to the aforementioned costumer benefit, it is necessary to know the air-
line’s behavior following the liberalization process. After this process, further opening of 
markets will provoke a downward pressure on prices offered by the airlines to their con-
sumers. This theoretical foundation -increased competition following liberalization and 
reduction of fares- is empirically assessed by Brander and Zhang (1993), who analysed it 
using a pooled cross-section and time-series data on 16 routes based at the hub airport of 
Chicago and operates by American Airlines and United Airlines in duopoly routes. The 
authors study, through regression analysis, if there is a competition following Cournot 
model or Bertrand model or if a formation of cartels occurs, concluding that there is a 
variable behavior (following the Green- Porter model) with an approach in periods of low 
prices –Cournot competition- and collusive agreements in higher rates stages.
The purpose of this paper is to collect the different reactions of agents involved in this 
industry and to determine whether a Cournot or a Bertrand competition is taking place 
through the study of 113 routes covering 97 % of the active connections in Spain.
The original contribution of this paper to the existing literature lies on an increase of 
both the sample size –the number of routes analysed so far in the work of Marin (1995) is 
tripled and the sample used by Betancor and Gonzalez (2013) for our country is likewise 
increased– and also the time horizon, which goes from one week –Marin (1995) and 
Betancor and González (2013)– to 96 fortnights, introducing different variables, such as 
price per mile charged by airlines, travel time, aircraft capacity and frequencies offered 
for each flight, distance between each origin-destination pair, amount of landing taxes at 
each destination airport and evolution of oil prices and consumer price index, as well as 
several dummy variables, for each of the 113 routes.
A data panel was develop by observing the prices offered via their websites by the 
different airlines providing regular-commercial traffic services in the domestic mar-
ket of our country, along with various other socio-economic variables, during the 96 
fortnights of the study. The methodology followed a theoretical model of oligopolistic 
competition with vertical differentiation of products, which could be empirically tested 
through three equations: a demand equation, a market structure equation and a price 
equation. The vertical differentiation will be the result of the frequency of the service 
as a competition variable.
The structure of this paper is as follows: after the introduction, the second section 
reviews the literature on this field while the third section provides a theoretical basis for 
the hypotheses that are to be tested in the empirical analysis, specifying the equations to 
be estimated in the fourth chapter. The data and sample sources are detailed in section 
5, with section 6 focusing on the results obtained. Section 7 presents the conclusions that 
can be drawn from the study.
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2. Review of the literature 
Betancor and González (2013) focused on the analysis of prices for airlines operating in 
Spain, concluding that an inverse relationship between the degree of competition and 
fares could be detected. This relationship is very clear in the case of routes where low cost 
airlines operate. Nuñez-Sánchez (2013) evaluates the pricing system for the Spanish port 
authorities during the period 1986-2005. Author estimates a system of equations. The 
estimation of demand functions for the use of port infrastructure enables us to calculate 
fee elasticities of demand. The sample consists of the 26 port authorities. After an estima-
tion of demand function, author demonstrates that demands for port infrastructure are 
inelastic. Betancor and Viecens (2012) also studied domestic air routes claiming that a 
significant number of airlines compete in this market and, although there is a prominent 
group of low demand routes where services are provided under monopoly, in general, 
three or more air operators compete in almost a third of all routes. Similarly, Betancor 
and Viecens (2011) analysed the importance of airports from several points of view, as 
well as their main features in terms of traffic. Sainz-González et al. (2011) determine the 
impact on fares in the Spanish leisure market airlines. Authors use an empirical speci-
fication of a pricing and demand equation system. Authors use a data related to ticket 
price for quarterly periods 2006 and 2007. Data are based on round trip flights carried 
out in 29 domestic airports where the flights were made for leisure purposes. They found 
a duality of the Spanish airline tourist market, given that the behavior of airlines is more 
competitive for the case of peninsular routes. A plausible explanation would be the exist-
ence of more alternative modes of transport for these routes (e.g. car, high speed rail) 
which makes the travel demand more sensitive to prices. Fu and Zhang (2010) studied 
the relationship between the demand for air transport and economic growth, highly 
valuing the empirical relationship of air transport’s multiplier effects on the economy. 
Moreover, Dobruszkes (2009) studied the degree of competition in air transport in 
Europe and concluded that competition in the air transport industry provides greater 
benefits to big cities and peripheral regions which receive major tourist inflows from 
large, northern cities in Western Europe. Njegovan (2006) evaluated the price elastic-
ity in leisure travel in the UK, concluding that demand for air transport is moderately 
inelastic regarding ticket prices. Grosche et al. (2007) presented two gravity models to 
estimate the volume of air passengers between city pairs. Martinez (2003) also noted the 
impact of multimarket contact between airlines on the price level, finding evidence of the 
existence of collusive behaviour and detecting exhaustion effects after the liberalisation 
of the sector. Rey (2003) addressed the behaviour of airlines during the liberalisation 
process (1989-1997), attempting to determine the effects that this process had on the 
relative efficiency of airlines. The author did not find significant differences in efficiency 
among airlines over the time horizon studied. With regard to the pricing strategy, the 
study concludes that costs are a key factor determined by the average distances travelled 
and the occupation. Companies tend to cut costs by attempting to extend the distances 
travelled and increasing the size and occupation rates of their aircraft. The latter would 
be the clearest effects of the introduction of competition in the aviation market. Benitez 
(2000) identified the factors affecting demand for air services. In particular, the author 
refers to economic (income, prices), structural (population, distance, alternative modes 
of transportation, systems of established routes) and quality factors, but the analysis is 
theoretical and not empirical.
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3. The theoretical model
Our identification procedure takes as a reference the Marin (1995) study of the European 
air market, and the Fageda (2004) study of the domestic air market in Spain.
One of the central themes in the literature on air transport refers to the effects of price 
competition. As is well known, companies can compete on price, quantities and qualities.
The most common approach to analyse the effects of price competition is to use a 
price equation in which these depend on variables that approximate the cost and qual-
ity of service function, variables related to the characteristics of demand and factors 
approaching the market power of the dominant airlines.
We can distinguish two types of studies to address the effects of price competition.
There is a first type of studies within the so-called multiple equation approach 
(Graham, 1985, Dresner and Tretheway 1992) which, applied to the US market, uses 
observations in the concentration level of the route, and concludes that there is a posi-
tive correlation between the price level and the degree of concentration in the route. The 
second type of work is the so-called single equation approach (Borenstein, 1989, Evans 
and Kessides, 1993a). It also refers to observations of the US domestic airport market 
and concludes that it is their power, rather than the route, that explains the ability of the 
major airlines to charge higher prices than their competitors.
In the multiple equation approach, it is worth mentioning the work of Marin (1995), 
conducting studies for the air transport market in Spain. These authors went one step 
further than previous studies and incorporated a market share equation, taking the fre-
quencies offered on each route and comparing them to the market average service on the 
route as one of the variables.
Specifically, these studies explicitly analyse the implications of competition on the 
market structure, rather than focusing solely on a price equation.
In addition, their empirical specification uses company-level variables on the 
route, in the equations for prices and market share, enabling them to capture possible 
intra-route heterogeneity. Moreover, vertical product differentiation is an important 
assumption of their theoretical and empirical formulation. This assumption can be 
considered realistic in the airline industry, where differences in quality between air-
lines arising from increased service frequency of dominant companies play an impor-
tant role in competition. This is the reason why the empirical specification used in our 
study is based on this approach.
The empirical specification used in this study is based on a model of oligopolistic 
competition with vertical product differentiation, in other words, a service quality-based 
model, analysing the frequencies offered for each route. In this model, in the last phase 
of the decision process, each company (i = 1 .....N) produces a set of products with a per-
ceived company quality, qi, compared to the average quality of all companies operating 
on the route , k, qk and companies set prices according to the market competition regime. 
Each consumer chooses the product of the company that allows him/her to maximise 
the quality/price ratio, qi/pi so the equilibrium condition for prices can be expressed as 
follows:
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for any company
  
i, j
                                                                  
(1)
Given the condition of equation (1), the individual demand function can be expressed 
as follows:
                                                                                                                                        (2)
So the amount sold by company i, xik, when Nk companies operate on the route, 
depends on the perceived quality of the company on the route k, qik, the prices of the 
company itself for the route k, pik, the average quality of all companies operating on 
the route, (qk) and other variables exogenous to the company (exogenous variables), 
called evik.
On the other hand, the market share of each company, SMik, depends on the relative 
price and quality of each company with respect to the average value of the route, k, and 
other exogenous variables.                                                                                                                          
(3) 
Expression (6) will provide the equation to estimate market share.
Assuming that companies compete following a Cournot model, the process of maxim-
ising profits provides the mark-up pricing equation on marginal costs:
(4) 
Where the mark-up, Ψik is a function of the relative perceived quality of each com-
pany with respect to the average market value qik/qk, the number of companies operating 
in the market Nk and marginal costs            . 
These costs will depend on determinant factors such as distance, capacity of 
the aircraft, frequency of service and/or occupation factor.
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4. The empirical model
All variables in empirical specifications shall be headed by the letter , meaning that the 
logarithms of the variables in question are used. In this sense, a total sample has been 
collected without considering the purpose of the trip and the equations for demand, 
prices and market share have been estimated. Regarding the variation by route, incor-
porating variables that refer to the characteristics of the route, such as distance, dummy 
for intermodal competition and dummy for operators, competition can help to manage 
these differences.
4.1 Equation of demand by route and company
According to equation (2) our empirical specification for the demand equation takes the 
following log form:
                                                                                                                                                   
  (5)
Where the dependent variable is the number of passengers on each route, Lxik.
The explanatory variables in this equation are as follows:
Lievk: Collects a proxy for the income exogenous variable approximated by the 
industrial production provincial index (IPI), as a proxy for economic activity. The IPI 
measures the monthly evolution of productive activity of industrial branches, that is, 
extraction, manufacturing and production industries as well as distribution of electricity, 
water and gas. A positive coefficient for this variable is expected.
Lqik: Number of daily frequencies offered by each of the airlines i with respect to the 
market average in each route k . A positive coefficient for this variable is expected as an 
indication of the “quality” perceived by the consumer for such services.
Lpik: The price per mile offered by each airline i for each route k. A negative sign is 
expected in the coefficient of this variable, assuming a normal demand curve.
DNk: This is a dummy variable representing the number of operators in each route 
k that takes value 1 on routes with competition from other airlines and 0 otherwise. A 
positive sign is expected as increased competition implicitly means greater demand in 
the market. The extreme case would be a natural monopoly in which demand allows only 
one airline.
4.2 Market share and company route equation
According to equation (3), our empirical specification for the market share equation by 
company takes the following logarithmic form:                                                                       
(6)
Where the dependent variable is the market share of each airline i on route k in terms 
of number of passengers carried by each company out of the total, LSMik. 
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The explanatory variables in this equation are:
Lpik:The price per mile offered by each airline i for each route k . A negative sign is 
expected in the coefficient of this variable, assuming a normal demand curve.
Lqik: Number of daily frequencies offered by each of the airlines i with respect to 
the market average in each route k. A negative sign is expected in the coefficient of this 
variable as increase of capacity.
DNk: This is a dummy variable representing the number of operators in each 
route k that takes the value 1 on routes with competition from other airlines and 0 
otherwise. A negative sign is expected as increased competition implicitly means a 
lower market share.
4.3. Pricing equation by company and route
The specification of the price equation, based on (4), is as follows:                                   
(7)
Where the dependent variable is the price per mile charged by each company i in each 
route k, Lpik .
The explanatory variables included in the equation to approximate the marginal costs 
are as follows:
Ldk: The distance between origin and destination of the route k. A negative sign is 
expected in the coefficient of the distance variable, since the costs per mile decrease with 
distance so a transfer of such reductions to prices can be expected.
Lcik: The average capacity of the aircraft used by each company i in each route k. The 
coefficient of this variable is undefined, since the larger the aircraft, the lower the costs 
and the higher the quality perceived by the consumer.
DNk: This is a dummy variable representing the number of operators (operators 
exogenous variable) on each route k ; it is set to 1 on routes with competition from other 
airlines and 0 otherwise. A negative sign is expected as increased competition implicitly 
means less market power (and therefore lower market share) to raise the price.
Lqik: Number of daily flights offered by each of the airlines i with respect to the mar-
ket average in each route k. A negative sign is expected in the coefficient of this variable 
due to scale economies.
5. Data sources and sample
In the Annex, Table offer the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in this research.
The sample used in the empirical analysis includes 96 observations on a fortnightly 
basis from March 2011 to February 2015 for the Spanish domestic market of regular 
flights, including 113 routes collected in Table 2 of the Annex.
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The information on the total passengers carried by each airline i in each route k, xik, 
and on the national total passengers with origin in each airport xnk has been obtained 
from the statistics published both by AENA and the Ministry of Public Works. Information 
regarding prices per mile pik for each company on each route, flight time on the route k, 
tk, capacity of the aircraft used by each operator i on each route k, cik and frequency 
of the flights of company i compared to the average of the market qik in route k, has 
been obtained through the websites of each airline and AENA. The methodology to track 
prices has been to make a reservation on the first and second Wednesday of each month 
to fly on the third and fourth Wednesday of that month (booking 15 days in advance in 
each fortnight) through the website of each airline operating in each route, and select-
ing a return ticket on the day, providing the destination was reached before 10 am and 
departure from the destination airport was always after 16 h.
The variable distance of route k, dk refers to the distance in miles between the ori-
gin and destination of each route, measured through an orthrodromic route, that is, the 
shortest distance between two points on the surface of the Earth.
Data on the market share SMik of each company on each route and the first operator 
SM1ik at the airport of origin of each route have been obtained from the financial reports 
of the airlines analysed.
The income exogenous variable (ievk) is approximated by the provincial value of the 
Industrial Production Index IPI offered by the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE).
The Consumption Price Provincial Index ipck corresponds to that offered by the INE. 
The Hotel Price Provincial Index iphk and the sum of the provincial population in each 
origin-destination route pobk were obtained from the INE.
The amount of landing taxes at each destination airport, taxk, has been obtained 
through AENA, while the price of oil, brent fuelk, has been compiled through the eco-
nomic website www.cincodias.com.
Moreover, we have included the following seven dummy variables: 1) Existence or 
absence of alternative direct transport, -alternative Transport- (Datk). This variable is set 
to 1 when direct routing exists and 0 otherwise. 2) Hours of alternative transportation, 
-alternative transport hours-(Dathk), which takes the value 1 if the alternative mode of 
transportation (bus, train, fast ferry in the case of the Balearic Islands) takes less than 
210 minutes, since in such case it is considered that there is a competitive means of 
alternative transportation, and takes the value 0 otherwise. To calculate this time we 
studied the information on transport times on the websites of each of the operators of 
each alternative mode of transportation. 3) Number of operators -operators exogenous 
variable-(DNk), which takes the value 1 on routes with more than one operator and 0 
otherwise. 4) Existence of a hub airport, -hub airport- (Dhak), which takes the value 1 
for airports with international flights operations and 0 otherwise. 5) Existence of routes 
operated by high-speed rail lines, AVE -high-speed train (Dhstk), which takes the value 1 
in routes where such transport exists and is set to 0 otherwise. 6) Presence of Ryanair at 
the origin airport, -Ryanair existence- (Dryek), which takes the value 1 if yes and 0 other-
wise. 7) Finally, the possibility that the origin airport maintains agreements to promote 
tourism -Tourist promotion agreement- (Dtpak), taking as reference the report of the 
National Competition Commission of Spain, which takes the value 1 when these arrange-
ments exist and 0 otherwise.
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We have included the existence of a hub airport dummy and the Ryanair presence 
in every route dummy according to Tretheway and Kincaid (2005) who review the lit-
erature about the economic effect of a market structure (Borenstein, 1990) on air fares 
following deregulation of the U.S. airline market. The authors concluding that regardless 
of market structure, the presence of a Low Cost Carriers (LCC) has a dramatic and per-
manent impact of fares in the market (Lee and Luengo-Prada, 2005).
6. Estimation and Results
In order to avoid endogeneity problems, the technique of estimation by instrumental 
variables (IV), Angrist and Krueger (2001) has been applied. This method allows a 
consistent estimate when variables are suspected to be endogenous and is based on the 
choice of a variable (instrument) that does not belong to the model initially estimated, 
is correlated with the explanatory variable (endogenous) and is not correlated with the 
error term of the estimated equation.
In addition, for the choice of instrumental variables to be a valid instrument to 
address the problem of endogeneity, these must be credible from an economic point of 
view and the equation to estimate must be properly identified (Murray, 2006). According 
to Angrist and Krueger (2001), estimation by instrumental variables not only corrects 
the endogeneity problem, but its application may avoid a problem of measurement error 
in the endogenous variable, which would lead to an attenuation bias in the estimates by 
Ordinary Least Squares, (OLS). 
There is an important aspect among the measures implemented to solve the problem 
of endogeneity, which is to ensure that the chosen variable for correction is not a weak 
instrument. To avoid this, the F-statistic of Wald Cragg-Donald is reviewed. If the critical 
value is greater than 10, the instrument is not considered weak (Stock and Yogo, 2005). 
This fact certifies that the variable considered as instrument predicts the endogenous 
variable correctly.
In the event that the instrument is weak, the slight presence of correlation between 
the instrument and the error term in the original equation can cause major inconsisten-
cies in the coefficients computed. This problem arises at the time when the instrument is 
very weakly correlated with the regressor (endogenous) or its size is very large (Angrist 
and Krueger, 2001). Within the referred technique of estimation by instrumental vari-
ables, the least squares method is implemented in two stages (2SLS), Theil (1961) and 
Basmann (1957); as well as the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), Hansen (1982).
After identifying the problem of endogeneity and having used MC2E, it is possible to 
use an alternative estimation method that allows for a greater degree of confidence, which 
is the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). This method is an estimator of instru-
mental variables, which ensures that the estimated parameters are consistent under the 
existence of conditions that validate the efficiency with which the available information 
is used. Furthermore, this method does not require the assumption of normality and 
allows estimates to a greater level of confidence, because it uses the orthogonality condi-
tions or moments for a more efficient estimate.
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That is, this method provides consistent estimators for the multiple regression model 
and confirms the independence of the exogenous variables under study.
Table 3 shows the results of each of the two estimates (least squares in two steps by 
instrumental variables and Generalized method of moments) for the demand equation. 
Table 4 presents the results for each of the two estimates (two-stage least squares with 
instrumental variables and Generalized method of moments) for the market share equa-
tion. Table 5 presents the results for each of the two estimates (least squares in two stages 
using instrumental variables and Generalized method of moments) for the price equation. 
The regressions were calculated using the econometric software Gretl 1.47.
Going to the data analysed, in Table 3 we can see how the explanatory variables have 
the expected sign and are significant at 1 %. Thus, it is possible to show that income, 
frequency, number of operators and prices are important determinants in the demand 
for business air transport in Spain. The elasticity of demand with respect to the approxi-
mated income by the industrial production index is 3.66 and the elasticity of demand 
with respect to the frequency is 2.13, while the elasticity of demand on the number of 
operators is 0.65. Finally, the price elasticity of demand is set to -0.60. Therefore, it is 
clear that the elasticity of demand with respect to frequency is much higher than the 
demand price elasticity (2.13 vs. -0.60), so this industry is more sensitive to competition 
in frequencies than in prices.
Analysing the market share equation in Table 4 we can see how the explanatory vari-
ables have the expected sign. Thus, it is shown that the prices, frecuencies and number 
of operators are important determinants in the market share of business air transport in 
Spain. The coefficient of the variable elasticity of the market share to price is positive and 
significant with a value of 0.20. That is, an increase in prices would imply an increase in 
market share. This sign is opposite to the expected value and can be explained due to the 
higher number of routes under the monopoly operation. The rate variable is significant 
and negative (-0.23). Therefore, an increase in the frequencies offered produces a reduc-
tion in market share. That is, the greater the frequency on a route, the more competition 
and less market share. The elasticity of the market share to the number of operators is 
significant and has a negative sign (-0.56). This means that if more than one operator 
competes on a route, the market share drops to 56 % of market share.
Table 5 shows the results for the price equation. All variables have the expected sign. 
The coefficient of the distance variable has the expected sign (-0.09). Greater distances 
entail lower prices, although this interpretation should be taken with caution, because 
the variable is only significant at 10 %. The coefficient of the variable “average aircraft 
size”, measured by available seat capacity per aircraft on each route, is significant at 1 
% and has a negative value (-0.63). That is, the more efficient the aircraft, the lower the 
prices. The price elasticity to the number of operators is significant and has a negative 
value (-1.13). This means that if more than one operator competes in a route, the price 
per mile drops by 113 %. This result is similar to that reported by Betancor et al. (2013).
Finally, the ratio of the daily frequency variable with respect to the market average is 
significant at 1 % and takes the value (-0.38); that allow us to ensure that there is an oli-
gopoly market structure. That is, the policy of pricing in the pricing in the airline industry 
in Spain is carried out by a few companies.
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On the other hand the results of table 6 show rates of Entropy, Herfindahl and Lerner 
exist for concluding oligopolistic market structure. In the airline industry in Spain are a 
few companies that perform pricing policy.
7. Conclusions 
In the study by Marin (1995) analysing the inter-European market, the results lead to the 
conclusion that price competition -Bertrand- is more important than competition in fre-
quency (quality) -Cournot- for the leisure air segment because in the demand equation 
estimated, price elasticity is -1.71, not significant for the frequency variable. In the work 
of Coto-Millán (2003), estimates for the pre-liberalisation period in Spain are presented 
without distinguishing between the leisure and business segments, with a demand price 
elasticity of -1.26 and an income elasticity of 1.32. This has been the situation in eighties 
and nineties in Spain and in the inter-European market. In this research the demand 
price elasticity is -0.60 and the estimated demand and frequency elasticity is 2.13. 
Demand and price elasticities are not very different. However, the demand frequency 
elasticity in the last study was twice as high as in the previous one.
In this research for the recent period 2011-2015, the results shown in the demand 
equation confirm this because the elasticity of demand regarding frequencies (2.13) has 
proved to be much higher than the price elasticity of demand (-0.60) showing that this 
industry competes more in frequencies (quality) than in prices. The above results show 
the progression from only price competition in the nineties, before liberalisation, to a 
balanced price and frequency competition, to an increased competition in frequencies 
compared to price in recent years.
It seems logical that, in a commuter passenger market catering to round-trip pas-
sengers with a highly valued concept of time, airlines compete via frequencies (quality) 
to attract passengers. That is, in this market, companies are competing to offer higher 
quality products (via a higher frequency of service) than their rivals on most routes in 
which more than one operator offers their services.
In this paper, the estimation of the price equation obtains similar results as Betancor 
and González (2013) in the sense that an inverse relationship is detected between 
the degree of competition (measured by DNk) and ticket price (price per ticket/mile). 
Moreover the results show rates of Entropy, Herfindahl and Lerner exist for concluding 
oligopolistic market structure. In the airline industry in Spain are a few companies that 
perform pricing policy.
In conclusion, we can say that the maintenance or improvement of effective competi-
tion in this segment of the aviation industry in Spain recommends greater competition in 
the prices offered by airlines, since competition in terms of frequencies (quality) is more 
intense (about three times).
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9. Annex tables
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. Source: Own elaboration.
 Variable Mean Median Mínimum Máximum Std. Dev. C.V.
Lxik 104.514 104.689 460.517 125.927 109.659 0.104923
Lxnk 126.949 129.564 606.146 143.186 135.926 0.107071
Lpik -0.512544 -0.450069 -305.130 164.581 0.818686 159.730
Ltk 423.454 417.439 355.535 539.363 0.340447 0.0803978
Lcik 489.353 519.296 391.202 524.175 0.444849 0.0909055
Lqik -0.14362 -0.25722 -14.130 17.352 0.50636 35.258
Ldk 550.360 552.545 426.268 686.380 0.568717 0.103335
LSMik -0.518146 -0.510826 -299.573 0.00000 0.546323 105.438
Lievk 450.377 450.910 405.340 477.200 0.114443 0.0254104
Lipck 463.207 463.603 459.139 466.240 0.0167499 0.00361608
Liphk 447.988 448.864 428.027 472.827 0.0922993 0.0206031
Lpobk 147.248 147.568 113.062 156.752 0.905913 0.0615230
Ltaxk 178.173 186.563 0.463734 213.535 0.347993 0.195313
Lfuelk 465.242 470.298 386.451 484.403 0.184368 0.0396284
Datk 0.835269 100.000 0.00000 100.000 0.370955 0.444114
Dathk 0.0945796 0.00000 0.00000 100.000 0.292647 309.419
DNk 0.589602 100.000 0.00000 100.000 0.491929 0.834341
Dhak 0.460177 0.00000 0.00000 100.000 0.498435 108.314
Dhstk 0.609145 100.000 0.00000 100.000 0.487965 0.801065
Dryek 0.833886 100.000 0.00000 100.000 0.372200 0.446343
Dtpak 0.442478 0.00000 0.00000 100.000 0.496703 112.255
Variable Skewness Ex. kurtosis Level (5.0 %) Level (95.0 %)  IQ Score Missing data
Lxik -0.617335 107.025 854.111 121.707 145.041 0
Lxnk -127.129 225.353 101.999 141.859 192.366 0
Lpik -0.127936 -0.753970 -188.333 0.822681 126.826 0
Ltk 0.495672 0.520006 368.888 504.343 0.435318 0
Lcik -111.962 -0.210700 391.202 524.175 0.737110 0
Lqik 0.58785 0.80284 -0.66269 0.59007 0.91629 0
Ldk 0.375566 0.488665 454.329 685.961 0.519875 0
LSMik -131.649 293.380 -142.712 0.00000 0.843970 0
Lievk -0.754561 157.344 430.767 467.243 0.141901 0
Lipck -0.409670 -0.970217 460.419 465.541 0.0277418 0
Liphk 0.00776093 -0.465135 432.466 462.272 0.132163 0
Lpobk -0.532014 -0.0796251 134.426 156.752 176.394 0
Ltaxk -164.212 299.236 0.963174 213.535 0.355729 0
Lfuelk -258.741 650.341 412.050 481.883 0.0983487 0
Datk -180.769 126.773 0.00000 100.000 0.00000 0
Dathk 277.084 567.756 0.00000 100.000 0.00000 0
DNk -0.364304 -186.728 0.00000 100.000 100.000 0
Dhak 0.159800 -197.446 0.00000 100.000 100.000 0
Dhstk -0.447367 -179.986 0.00000 100.000 100.000 0
Dryek -179.421 121.918 0.00000 100.000 0.00000 0
Dtpak 0.231626 -194.635 0.00000 100.000 100.000 0
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Table 2. Routes of the Spanish market included in the sample (2011-2015).
Origin Destination Airline Origin Destination Airline
A Coruña Barcelona VLG Bilbao Barcelona VLG
A Coruña Madrid IBE Bilbao Madrid IBE
Alicante Barcelona VLG Bilbao Madrid UX
Alicante Madrid IBE Bilbao Santiago ANE
Almería Madrid ANE Bilbao Valencia ANE
Asturias Barcelona VLG Gran Canaria Madrid IBE
Asturias Madrid IBE Gran Canaria Madrid UX
Barcelona A Coruña VLG Granada Madrid IBE
Barcelona Alicante VLG Ibiza Barcelona FR
Barcelona Asturias VLG Ibiza Barcelona VLG
Barcelona Bilbao VLG Ibiza Madrid ANE
Barcelona Granada VLG Ibiza Madrid FR
Barcelona Ibiza FR Ibiza Mallorca ANE
Barcelona Ibiza VLG Ibiza Valencia ANE
Barcelona Madrid IBE Jerez Madrid IBE
Barcelona Madrid UX La Rioja Madrid ANE
Barcelona Madrid VLG Madrid A Coruña IBE
Barcelona Málaga FR Madrid Alicante IBE
Barcelona Málaga VLG Madrid Almería ANE
Barcelona Mallorca FR Madrid Asturias IBE
Barcelona Mallorca UX Madrid Barcelona IBE
Barcelona Mallorca VLG Madrid Barcelona UX
Barcelona Menorca UX Madrid Barcelona VLG
Barcelona Menorca VLG Madrid Bilbao IBE
Barcelona Santiago FR Madrid Bilbao UX
Barcelona Santiago VLG Madrid Gran Canaria IBE
Barcelona Sevilla FR Madrid Gran Canaria UX
Barcelona Sevilla VLG Madrid Granada IBE
 
Note: VLG, Vueling. IBE, Iberia. ANE, Air Nostrum. FR, Ryanair and UX, Air Europa.
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Table 2 (cont.). Routes of the Spanish market included in the sample (2011-2015).
Origin Destination Airline Origin Destination Airline
Madrid Ibiza FR Melilla Madrid ANE
Madrid Jerez IBE Menorca Barcelona VLG
Madrid Málaga IBE Menorca Madrid ANE
Madrid Mallorca FR Menorca Mallorca ANE
Madrid Mallorca IBE Murcia Madrid ANE
Madrid Mallorca UX Pamplona Madrid IBE
Madrid Melilla ANE San Sebastián Madrid ANE
Madrid Menorca UX Santander Madrid ANE
Madrid Pamplona ANE Santander Madrid FR
Madrid San Sebastián ANE Santiago Barcelona FR
Madrid Santander ANE Santiago Bilbao ANE
Madrid Santander FR Santiago Madrid FR
Madrid Santiago FR Santiago Madrid IBE
Madrid Santiago IBE Sevilla Alicante ANE
Madrid Sevilla ANE Sevilla Barcelona FR
Madrid Tenerife Norte IBE Sevilla Barcelona VLG
Madrid Valencia ANE Sevilla Gran Canaria VLG
Madrid Vigo IBE Sevilla Madrid IBE
Madrid Vigo UX Sevilla Valencia ANE
Málaga Barcelona FR Tenerife Norte Madrid IBE
Málaga Barcelona VLG Tenerife Norte Madrid UX
Málaga Madrid IBE Valencia Bilbao ANE
Mallorca Barcelona FR Valencia Ibiza ANE
Mallorca Barcelona UX Valencia Madrid ANE
Mallorca Barcelona VLG Valencia Málaga ANE
Mallorca Ibiza ANE Valencia Sevilla ANE
Mallorca Madrid FR Vigo Madrid IBE
Mallorca Madrid IBE Vigo Madrid UX
Mallorca Menorca ANE
 Note: VLG, Vueling. IBE, Iberia. ANE, Air Nostrum. FR, Ryanair and UX, Air Europa.
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Table 3. Demand Equation Results. Source: Own elaboration. 
Two-Stage Least Squares TSLS
Instrumental Variables: const Dathk Dhak Dhstk Lfuelk Lipck
Equation 1 Coef. Coef. Value std. error z-stat P-Value
Const δ0 -6.45 1.75 -3.69 0.0002 ***
Lievk α1 3.66 0.39 9.27 1.83e-020 ***
Lqik α2 2.13 0.19 11.12 9.75e-029 ***
Lpik α3 -0.60 0.06 -8.70 3.21e-018 ***
DNk α4 0.65 0.14 4.58 4.55e-06 ***
System of equations. Generalized method of moments (GMM)
Instrumental Variables: const Dathk Dhak Dhstk Lfuelk Lipck
Equation 1 Coef. Coef. Value std. error z-stat P-Value
Const δ0 -6.48 1.77 -3.65 0.0003 ***
Lievk α1 3.67 0.40 9.17 4.48e-020 ***
Lqik α2 2.13 0.17 12.02 2.64e-033 ***
Lpik α3 -0.60 0.06 -8.97 2.81e-019 ***
DNk α4 0.64 0.13 4.85 1.18e-06 ***
 Two-Stage Least Squares TSLS
R-squared 0.454584 Adjusted R-squared 0.454383
Mean dependent var 10.45137 S.D. dependent var 1.096588
Sum squared resid 10234.01 S.E. of regression 0.971512
(*): * indicates weak evidence (p between 0.1 and 0.05), ** indicates stronger evidence (p between 0.05 and 0.01), and *** indicates 
very strong evidence (p smaller than 0.01). 
Weak instruments test
Cragg-Donald minimum eigenvalue = 19.8481
Critical values for TSLS bias relative to OLS:
bias 5 % 10 % 20 % 30 %
value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Relative bias is probably less than 5 %
Note: A value < 10 may indicate weak instruments (Stock and Yogo, 2005).
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Table 4. Market Share Equation Results. Source: Own elaboration. 
Two-Stage Least Squares TSLS
Instrumental Variables: const Lcik Lxnk LSM1iK Dtpak
Equation 2 Coef. Coef. Value std. error z-stat P-Value
Const δ0 -0.11 0.03 -2.82 0.0047 ***
Lpik β1 0.20 0.03 5.59 0.0000 ***
Lqik β2 -0.23 0.05 -3.87 0.0001 ***
DNk β3 -0.56 0.08 -6.66 0.0000 ***
System of equations. Generalized method of moments (GMM)
Instrumental Variables: const Lcik Lxnk LSM1iK Dtpak
Equation 2 Coef. Coef. Value std. error z-stat P-Value
Const δ0 -0.11 0.03 -3.15 0.0016 ***
Lpik β1 0.20 0.03 5.93 2.88e-09 ***
Lqik β2 -0.23 0.05 -4.11 3.95e-05 ***
DNk β3 -0.56 0.07 -7.50 6.23e-014 ***
 Two-Stage Least Squares TSLS
R-squared 0.416123 Adjusted R-squared 0.415961
Mean dependent var -0.518146 S.D. dependent var 0.546323
Sum squared resid 1916.443 S.E. of regression 0.420391
(*): * indicates weak evidence (p between 0.1 and 0.05), ** indicates stronger evidence (p between 0.05 and 0.01), and *** indicates 
very strong evidence (p smaller than 0.01).
Weak instruments test
Cragg-Donald minimum eigenvalue = 29.0831
Critical values for TSLS bias relative to OLS:
bias 5 % 10 % 20 % 30 %
value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Relative bias is probably less than 5 %
Note:  A value < 10 may indicate weak instruments (Stock and Yogo, 2005).
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Table 5. Price Equation Results. Source: Own elaboration. 
Two-Stage Least Squares TSLS
Instrumental Variables: const  Dtpak Dathk Datk Lpobk Liphk
Equation 3 Coef. Coef. Value std. error z-stat P-Value
Const δ3 3.76 0.64 5.87 4.13e-09 ***
Ldk θ2 -0.09 0.05 -1.78 0.0745 *
Lcik θ3 -0.63 0.10 -6.19 5.74e-10 ***
DNk θ3 -1.13 0.10 -11.34 8.37e-030 ***
Lqik θ4 -0.38 0.14 -2.67 0.0075 ***
System of equations. Generalized method of moments (GMM)
Instrumental Variables: const Dtpak Dathk Datk Lpobk Liphk
Equation 3 Coef. Coef. Value std. error z-stat P-Value
Const δ3 3.70 0.61 6.06 1.33e-09 ***
Ldk θ2 0.09 0.05 -1.83 0.0667 *
Lcik θ3 -0.63 0.10 -6.19 5.89e-010 ***
DNk θ3 -1.15 0.09 -12.32 6.74e-035 ***
Lqik θ4 -0.39 0.13 -2.85 0.0043 ***
Two-Stage Least Squares TSLS
R-squared 0.288211 Adjusted R-squared 0.287949
Mean dependent var -0.512544 S.D. dependent var 0.818686
Sum squared resid 6514.746 S.E. of regression 0.775129
(*): * indicates weak evidence (p between 0.1 and 0.05), ** indicates stronger evidence (p between 0.05 and 0.01), and *** indicates 
very strong evidence (p smaller than 0.01).
Weak instruments test
Cragg-Donald minimum eigenvalue = 20.3802
Critical values for TSLS bias relative to OLS:
bias 5 % 10 % 20 % 30 %
value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Relative bias is probably less than 5 %
Note:  A value < 10 may indicate weak instruments (Stock and Yogo, 2005).
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Table 6. Entropy, Herfindahl and Lerner Index (2014). Source: Own elaboration.
 TOTAL SHARE ( %) ENTROPY INDEX
HERFINDAL 
INDEX
LERNER 
INDEX
Vueling 15,104,393 29.54 0.16 0.09 0.17
Ryanair 9,918,910 19.36 0.14 0.04 0.07
Iberia + IB Express 9,871,562 19.27 0.14 0.04 0.07
Air Europa 9,089,176 17.74 0.13 0.03 0.06
Air Nostrum 5,219,415 10.19 0.10 0.01 0.02
Air Berlin 1,930,997 3.77 0.05 0.00 0.00
Others 92,21 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
TOTAL 51,226,663 100 0.73 0.21 0.41
